Mother Jones Daily: War Watch
March 31, 2003
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| Truth Teller? Is Peter Arnett a courageous truth-teller, an unfortunte pawn, or a treasonous turncoat? Not surprisingly, it depends on who you ask. | |||||
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Washington's plan for Iraq after the war looks very American -- except for the lack of democracy.
Destroying the Village
Will criticism of the Pentagon's war plans lead to more civilian casualties?
Have Clip Art, Will Dissent
By Tim Dickinson
What do you get when you mix politics, profanity, and clip art? For comic artist David Rees, the answer is an Internet sensation.
| "I myself feel that our country, for whose Constitution I fought in a just war, might as well have been invaded by Martians and body snatchers." -- Kurt Vonnegut | ||||
While the mainstream antiwar movement in the US searches for a defining, uniting message, the first conscientous objector makes a stand.
The First Conscientious Objector of This War (The Guardian)
For Military Families Opposed to War, a Double Anguish (Salon)
Why Left and Right Must Unite (Antiwar.com)
- "A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions."
That was President Bush in February, arguing that an invasion to topple Saddam could inspire nations throughout the Middle East to embrace democracy. Now, as US and British troops fight towards Baghdad, we're being given a sense of the 'inspirational' structure the Bush administration is preparing to build in post-war Iraq. And, despite calls for the United Nations to have a role, despite assurances that the new Iraq would be run by Iraqis, it is a very American plan. Or, to be more accurate, it is a very Pentagon plan, almost entirely orchestrated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his hawkish deputies. Moreover, while run by Americans, post-war Iraq as envisioned by Rumsfeld & co. would seem to lack one defining American characteristic: an attachment to democratic principles.
As Brian Whitaker and Luke Harding of The Guardian report, Washington's plan calls for a government comprised of 23 ministries, each headed by an American, with four Iraqi 'advisors' in each ministry, also appointed by the Americans. And the decisions about who will be appointed, Whitaker and Harding write, "appear to be entirely in US hands, particularly those of Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defence."
- "The most controversial of Mr Wolfowitz's proposed appointees is Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the opposition Iraqi National Congress, together with his close associates, including his nephew. During his years in exile, Mr Chalabi has cultivated links with Congress to raise funds, and has become the Pentagon's darling among the Iraqi opposition. The defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, is one of his strongest supporters. The state department and the CIA, on the other hand, regard him with deep suspicion."
But Chalabi is hardly the only controversial move being considered by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and the other Pentagon hawks running the reconstruction plan. The Sydney Morning Herald reports that Rumsfeld, in "an effort to ensure the Pentagon controls every aspect of reconstructing Iraq and forming a new government," has refused to appoint several career diplomats suggested by the State Department -- including some with more experience in the region than most of the Pentagon's picks.
- "While vetoing the group of eight current and former officials, including several ambassadors to Arab states, the Pentagon's top civilian leadership has planned prominent roles in the postwar administration for the former CIA director James Woolsey and others who have long supported replacing Iraq's government, sources said.
The dispute is over who will occupy de facto cabinet ministries under retired general Jay Garner, the Pentagon's head of a new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, until the country can be fully handed over to Iraqis. Portfolios such as education and trade were to be filled by the State Department, with the Pentagon choosing the "civilian advisers" for other departments. Sources said that Walter Slocum, who served as undersecretary of defence during the Clinton administration, has been pencilled in for the Iraqi defence ministry.
The Pentagon had listed Mr Woolsey for the Iraqi information ministry, sources said, until the White House suggested he might be inappropriate because of his CIA background and close association with one faction of the Iraqi opposition."
Of course, Rumsfeld himself will be at the top of the pyramid being planned for post-war Iraq. As the Herald points out, in the chain of command, Garner's office falls under the direction of General Tommy Franks, the leader of the US Central Command. And Franks answers to Rumsfeld. In fact, in the entire structure as envisioned, none of the appointed officials will report to anyone outside of the Pentagon's chain of command.
That fact has humanitarian organizations and aid workers worried. And several have formed a loose coalition to protest the Pentagon's plan for Iraq. At this point, they have a simple aim: push Garner out of the picture. A former general and executive for a Pentagon contractor is absolutely not the right choice to run a humanitarian mission, they declare on their web site, dumpjaygarner.com.
- "No matter our feelings about the war, all of us hope for a better future for the people of Iraq. A future where Iraqis can make their own destiny and be free from war, terror and political oppression.
Yet currently the task of overseeing the transition to democracy in Iraq will fall on the shoulders of a man who was chosen by the Bush Administration in secret. Without a confirmation hearing or even a press interview.
His name is Jay Garner. And he's the wrong guy for the job.
As a former Army General who until recently was building weapons systems now being used to bomb Baghdad, Jay Garner is no man of peace. In fact, he's just the man to inflame Iraq and the region."
As Oliver Morgan writes in The Guardian, Garner does have some experience in Iraq, playing a senior role in the US effort to protect the country's Kurds after the 1991 Gulf War. But the former general also has close ties to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Vice President Dick Cheney. He has been a staunch advocate of 'regime change' in Iraq, and a staunch opponent of allowing the UN to play any role in the post-war reconstruction. Finally, Morgan writes, like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, Garner is ardently pro-Israel.
- "In October 2000 he put his name to a statement that said that 'Israel had exercised remarkable restraint in the face of lethal violence orchestrated by the leadership of a Palestinian Authority'.
The organisation behind the statement was the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, which includes Cheney and Richard Perle, another arch-hawk, among its advisers past and present."
In fact, the institute can boast having just about every prominent administration hawk on its membership rolls. While the American Enterprise Institute (also home to administration insiders) has emerged as the cradle of neoconservative foreign policy, the Jewish Institute has become the definitive source for neocon thought on the Middle East. The two groups share more than membership -- both institutes have embraced the belief that a post-Saddam Iraq, tethered closely to Washington, could serve as a vital regional counter to the anti-Israeli governments in Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
But the vision hardly stops there. The neocon hawks see rebuilding Iraq in America's image as only the first step in a much larger process to remake the entire Middle East. The ultimate goal: A region which is in thrall to the US and friendly to Israel. As Robert Dreyfuss writes in The American Prospect, "those who think that U.S. armed forces can complete a tidy war in Iraq, without the battle spreading beyond Iraq's borders, are likely to be mistaken."
- "In the Middle East, impending "regime change" in Iraq is just the first step in a wholesale reordering of the entire region, according to neoconservatives -- who've begun almost gleefully referring to themselves as a "cabal." Like dominoes, the regimes in the region -- first Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, then Lebanon and the PLO, and finally Sudan, Libya, Yemen and Somalia -- are slated to capitulate, collapse or face U.S. military action. To those states, says cabal ringleader Richard Perle, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and chairman of the Defense Policy Board, an influential Pentagon advisory committee, "We could deliver a short message, a two-word message: 'You're next.'" In the aftermath, several of those states, including Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia, may end up as dismantled, unstable shards in the form of mini-states that resemble Yugoslavia's piecemeal wreckage. And despite the Wilsonian rhetoric from the president and his advisers about bringing democracy to the Middle East, at bottom it's clear that their version of democracy might have to be imposed by force of arms."
But Dreyfuss -- who is writing about Washington's long-range policy with more insight than just about anybody these days -- notes that the sweeping, imperial neocon strategy raises desperate stakes for all involved. While the hawks at the AEI may see this as "about what sort of role the United States intends to play in the twenty-first century" (the words of neocon scribes William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan), Dreyfuss reminds us that the vision "can only have a devastating and highly destabilizing impact on the entire region, from Egypt to central Asia and Pakistan."
- "'They want to foment revolution in Iran and use that to isolate and possibly attack Syria in [Lebanon's] Bekaa Valley, and force Syria out,' says former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Edward S. Walker, now president of the Middle East Institute. 'They want to pressure [Muammar] Quaddafi in Libya and they want to destabilize Saudi Arabia, because they believe instability there is better than continuing with the current situation. And out of this, they think, comes Pax Americana.'
...
Scenarios for sweeping changes in the Middle East, imposed by U.S armed forces, were once thought fanciful -- even ridiculous -- but they are now taken seriously given the incalculable impact of an invasion of Iraq. Chas Freeman, who served as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, worries about everything that could go wrong. 'It's a war to turn the kaleidoscope, by people who know nothing about the Middle East,' he says. 'And there's no way to know how the pieces will fall.'"
Destroying the Village
It remains one of the most infamous nuggets of martial illogic to emerge from the Vietnam War: The contention, as expressed by a still-unnamed US officer, that "we had to destroy the village in order to save it."
Now, with US troops again facing the bitter realities of guerrilla warfare and hostile local populations, there is increasing fear that military commanders will adopt the discredited approach in Iraq. Already, some retired military officers and hawkish civilians are calling on Washington to 'take the gloves off.' 'Shock and Awe,' with its focus on avoiding casualties, has failed, they contend, as has the Pentagon's plan for using a small force to attack Iraq's military leadership. Now, they argue, the US must build up its ground forces and prepare for a prolonged and brutal fight.
Already, there are indications that US commanders are open to such counsel: An unnamed senior military officer told reporters in Kuwait that the US was "prepared to pay a very high price" to capture Baghdad and defeat Saddam Hussein's regime. And, while the officer was speaking of US military casualties, any such undertaking is almost certain to result in scores of civilian deaths.
Tuesday, April 1 Monday, March 31 Friday, March 28 Thursday, March 27 Wednesday, March 26 | |||||
- "We have no choice but to adopt the last option with more bombing and taking the war to the enemy, even if that means the dreadful level of casualties that will go with it. We will still be hated, but we will also be held in awe. That is now a consequence of any further action we take.
Fear and respect is not as good as friendship and understanding but it is better than being despised.
We should never have found ourselves in this position, but our leaders took us here. They now need the courage to make the right, tough decisions, for there is no easy way out of this monumental mistake."
Mowlam is brutally honest about her desire to "win this war quickly." And the need behind the urging is political, not military. Some, including retired Army officer Jim McDonough, are unwilling to accept paying such a high price for a political need. Writing in The Washington Post, McDonough argues that the Iraqi resistance, while possibly surprising today, is ultimately doomed. The regime of Saddam Hussein is not beloved, and cannot inspire devotion for long, McDonough reasons.
- "Let us not be in a hurry to win today what we will inevitably win in a short enough time, not if we have to do so by paying a much higher price in friendly and innocent casualties... Measured by the essential elements of military doctrine, the odds are heavily stacked in our favor."
Finally, despite Mowlam's anguished argument, most of the calls for continued restraint are coming from British voices. In particular, British military commanders in Iraq and Kuwait are chastising their American counterparts for condoning conduct that is needlessly aggressive. The editors of The independent declare that US commanders -- and US politicians -- would do well to heed that advice.
- "The vocabulary of leading members of the Bush administration has done nothing to temper the impression of undue belligerence. Earlier US remarks to the effect that activities such as peacekeeping were for "wimps" hardly helped. If the campaign in Iraq is to be as humanitarian in intent as we were led to believe, the Americans must take more care with their words, as with their deeds.
The British army prides itself, with justification, on the precision, guile and forbearance that it acquired in Northern Ireland. The signs are that these skills are proving valuable in Iraq, and will become more so as the war proceeds. But we should not forget that these techniques were hard-won and that there were many deaths, injuries and just plain errors along the way.
The price of excessive or indiscriminate belligerence is high. And in Iraq, where the professed aim is to liberate, the price of failing to observe our self-imposed rules of restraint will be even higher."
