War in Chechnya

Kadyrov, a former cleric and rebel leader, fought against the Russians in the first Chechen War between 1994 and 1996, but shifted loyalties after the second Russian invasion in 1999. With an assist from Moscow, which pressured all his opponents to withdraw their candidacies, Kadyrov won the republic's presidency in bogus elections held last October.

Not many Chechens will be shedding tears over Kadyrov. The ex-president used his power to further Moscow's designs, terrorizing the republic's population, most notably by means of the 3,000-man militia headed by his son. As Irina Zvegelskaya, an expert at the Center for Political and International Studies in Moscow puts it:

"Kadyrov made himself indispensible to the Kremlin…He wasn't much loved or respected by the majority of Chechens, but there is no doubt that he imposed a kind of order in Chechnya. He did this by using violence, oppression and other very unpopular measures, but he was able to deliver stability. With him gone, the whole program is in crisis."

The problem is that Kadyrov's – and Putin's -- "order" is an illusion. The Kremlin has regained control of television channels, and widespread self-censorship among journalists has ensured that Russians see, for the most part, what the government wants them to see. Even so, extensive coverage of conferences between Kadyrov and Putin and happy Chechen children going on field trips have not erased the reality of daily attacks on Russian soldiers. The media's silence has been in sharp contrast to the critical coverage of and public opposition the 1994-1996 Chechen War. In 1996, a ceasefire between Moscow and the rebels was reached and Chechnya was accorded self-rule. Aslan Maskhadov, the rebel leader who was elected Chechnya's president in 1997, was unable to establish control over the republic's militias -- some of which established ties to al-Qaeda and other extremist Islamist groups abroad.

In 1999, apartment bombings in Moscow and incursions into the neighboring republic of Daghestan by Chechen rebels translated into strong support for Putin, who orchestrated the second Chechen war under the then President Boris Yelstin. A number of Chechens believe that the bombings and the Daghestan unrest were the work of Kremlin, merely a pretext to launch the second war -- a charge Russian officials have furiously denied. Following the First Chechen War, the rebels have increasingly resorted to bombings, including suicide bombings, of government and civilian targets in Chechnia and beyond -- as was the case with the February metro bombing in Moscow. The rebels want the Russians and their Chechen puppets out of Chechnya -- this has remained a constant since 1994 and long before then. Although in 1996 most Russians were willing to swallow de-facto Chechen independence, the “Palestinization” of Chechnya -- with the suicide bombings and the collective punishment of the civilian population that this entails -- has fundamentally transformed public opinion.

It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians and tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed in the two wars. Leaked government statistics provide a picture of a republic far from normal. As Human Rights Watch reported on the findings on one such government source:

"According to an unpublished report on criminal activity in Chechnya, in 2002 1,132 civilians were killed, or between five and eight times the murder rate for Russia, and between ten and fifteen times the murder rate for Moscow."

There are some 70,000 Russian troops in Chechnya right now, and according to an estimate last year by one human rights group, some 11, 000 have been killed so far in the recent war. The Russian government, insisting that the situation has normalized, has been closing down refugee camps in neighboring Ingushetia, forcing the refugees to trade one set of miserable living conditions for another. As Human Rights Watch reports:

"During the Chechnya conflict, now in its fifth year, tens of thousands of civilians have fallen victim to abuses perpetrated by both Russian forces and Chechen rebels. These abuses include indiscriminate bombings and several massacres, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, rape, torture and arbitrary detentions. The overwhelming majority of these crimes remained uninvestigated and unpunished."

Kadyrov's assassination is bound to bring about more such abuses. Putin has already said that retribution will follow; immediately following the assassination, he promoted Kadyrov's son -- the man responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in the republic -- to the post of First Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya. As Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Andrei Babitskii put it:

"I think that, of course, a vendetta will take place…I think that now, all of Kadyrov's forces, who already acted very cruelly -- much more cruelly than the federal forces -- they of course will start a hunt. In most cases this hunt will be motivated by revenge. It will aim to avenge the death of a political leader as well, the death of a relative, a man who belonged to the same clan, if you want."

Having invested so much power in Kadyrov and given him a free-hand in eliminating his political opponents, it won't be easy for Moscow to find a suitable replacement.

Since the second Iraq War, criticism by Western governments of the abuses in Chechnya have subsided, in large part because of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. In the case of the United States, looking the other way on Chechnya has been repaid with Putin's relatively subdued critique of the occupation of Iraq, which is deeply unpopular in Russia. Many point to September 11 as the turning point that allowed Bush and Putin to use the label of "international terrorism" to paint their enemies as one and the same. The links between al-Qaeda and some of the Chechen rebels are real – which is more than can be said of the Saddam-Qaeda link. Unfortunately, Putin's propensity to label Chechen leaders who don't agree with him as terrorists -- whether they are not -- and the Russian military's brutal conduct in the republic have only won more converts to al-Qaeda's cause. As Andrei Piontkovsky, Director of Institute for Strategic Studies in Moscow, writes in Washington Post:

"The Russian leadership constantly reiterates that it is not fighting Chechen separatists but international terrorists, and this has finally become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thanks to the methods with which we have waged this war, we have turned practically the whole population of Chechnya into enemies and created for metaphysical terrorism a huge reservoir of living bombs -- desperate people ready to carry out the plans of the terrorists."

The E.U., which has been a much more outspoken critic of Russian tactics in Chechnya has, like the U.S., been consumed by the Iraqi invasion and occupation. The recent E.U. enlargement -- a matter on which Russian cooperation was necessary – has also deflected attention from Chechnya.

With the photos of American soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib broadcast all over the world, the State Department's Human Rights report has already been delayed. When it does come out, abuses by Russian forces and Chechen rebels are not likely to be high priority for either Western governments or media organizations. Now, more than ever, Washington's lecturing of Moscow and others on the need to respect human rights are going to be scoffed at as highly hypocritical.

Putin said that "Akhmad Kadyrov passed away on 9 May, on the day of our national holiday, the day of victory. And he left victorious as well." It was indicative of the sort doublespeak that has been become the hallmark of government statements on Chechnya. The Chechnya that Kadyrov left is a bombed out, destitute, and lawless. Chechnya is a feeding ground for terrorism that has spread far beyond it. If Kadyrov left "victorious, " it was only in they eyes of those who would accept nothing less than his death and Moscow's ouster from the region as a victory.